High support for Russia or sympathy for the “Russian factor” in general in the Serbian public is a phenomenon in itself. Depending on which research questions were asked and in which interval the surveys were conducted, the support of the respondents fluctuated from 50 to as much as 85 percent.
Among other historical or religious reasons, for example, they play a key role in shaping public opinion – politically.
On the one hand, the Western attitude towards Serbia, continuous pressures on various topics, the huge “mess” in Kosovo and Metohija and disappointment in the failed concept of European integration have further limited American, British and European “influences” among the “broad masses”.
Despite investments in the media, the non-governmental sector and deep control of the political elite. On the other hand, thanks to the strengthening of Russian political and military power, Moscow has returned to global geopolitics in style, and has once again become a respectable great power. Hence the growth of expectations of the Serbian public, which were often unrealistic.
In general, the preconditions for supporting the Russian position existed even before the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis. However, although this support is to some extent based on established (geopolitical) inertia or (political) intuition, there are a few more things that make it expressive. Thanks to them, the answer is: why does the Serbian public not support Ukraine?
Conflict with the West
First, the conflict that has just flared up is the conflict between the United States and Russia. Ukraine served as a tool for NATO’s aggressive intentions, and the political elite in Kiev that agreed to that role contributed crucially to the disaster we are seeing.
Assessing that Russia will not react militarily in previous years, the number of provocations on the line of demarcation increased, diplomatic attempts were ignored, and no minimum interest was shown in fulfilling what was signed in Minsk and then verified by a Security Council resolution. Peace could be preserved by respecting what was agreed.
Secondly, provocations were operationalized through constant shelling of buildings in Donbas and sabotage activities (Alexander Zakharchenko, the most important political figure in Donetsk, was killed in August 2018 after the sabotage incursion), with occasional announcements of a “final solution”.
President Poroshenko once underlined: “We will have a job, they will not. We will have pensions, they will not. We will have a child allowance, they will not. Our children will go to schools and kindergartens, theirs will sit in basements. That’s exactly how we’re going to win this war. “
Has anyone reacted to that, threatened sanctions, warned politically? The civilian population died and suffered. The dynamics of the development of the conflict is somewhat different from what they represent in the West, and their regional offices are regularly transmitting.
Third, Ukraine today, viewed from the political and institutional level, is not the country it was eight years ago. Circumstances have changed beyond recognition.
The new political discourse is based on an extreme anti-Russian setting, the cult of Stepan Bandera is being built, politicians of the profile of Tjagnibok, Turčinov and Ljaško have had or still have certain roles. Paramilitary formations of extremist (some neo-Nazi) ideological orientation are presented as striking songs in the struggle for freedom and independence. The burning of innocent people in Odessa by members of the infamous “Azov” is one of their actions. It is also possible to write for a long time about the actions of the volunteer battalions “Ajdar” and “Donbas”. This cannot be hidden by replacing the thesis in the propaganda war.
Fourth, despite the fact that fundamental changes within the country have been going on for almost a decade, it remains open – which Ukraine can we talk about? These changes were carried out with the construction of artificial political narratives, essential obstructions of the political engagement of anyone who thinks differently (Viktor Medvedchuk is the last in line), the adoption of discriminatory laws against the Russian-speaking population and the harsh imposition of identity patterns. Ukraine is divided, less by religious and ethnic verticals, more by cultural and linguistic diagonals.
The issue of domestic policy
Russians and Malorussians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Zaporozhian Cossacks and Transcarpathian Ruthenians are woven into the modern Ukrainian identity, especially Odessans. The imposed identity pattern promoted Galician-Western Ukrainian as all-Ukrainian, which was foreign to parts of the population and induced divisions.
When the West talks about support for Ukraine, then not all differences and complexities are supported, but exclusivity and a simplified view of reality, exactly what is the cause of the division.
Due to the media noise, which is the strongest in the first days of the war, it will not be noticed, but as time passes, it will become clearer that Russian military intervention is understood completely differently from what Zelenski and Klitschko say. For many, who have suffered various pressures and threats all these years, the arrival of the Russian army will be a liberation.
Quite possibly, to those who create the media image, employees in the non-governmental sector and parts of the Serbian political elite – these are unknown things. But that does not mean that these are unknown things to the public, that is, those parts of the political opinion interested in this particular thing.
Much has been written in previous years about the war in Donbas, the events in Ukraine and Russia’s reactions, and even more has been reported from various “alternative channels”, a fact that should not be ignored in the analysis of the Serbian public’s position. The level of information is not small, nor is it limited to the mere translation of texts and news from major Western portals and television.
High support for Russia in Serbia has its foundations in the preconditions built for two decades, but it also concerns the events during the civil war in Ukraine from 2014 onwards. That is why the introduction of sanctions against Russia, following the example of Western countries, is impossible. This is not a foreign policy issue, but a domestic one. Such a step would, therefore, mean major internal fractures and enormous destabilization.
The mood of the public towards Russia and Russian actions in Ukraine is completely different than elsewhere, and that must be taken into account.
Cover photo: Sputnik / Stefan Đurić
Source Sputnik
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